

Who Trusted the 2024 Election? Assessing Voter Confidence in Ballot Counting Within and Across Racial and Ethnic Groups

July 13, 2026

Raquel Centeno*

R. Michael Alvarez**

* Postdoctoral Teaching Scholar Fellow in Science, Society, and Policy (Linde Center for Science, Society, and Policy), Caltech

** Flintridge Foundation Professor of Political and Computational Social Science (Division of Humanities and Social Sciences), Caltech

Abstract

Voter trust in elections is critical to democratic legitimacy. Yet it has long been known that nonwhite American voters are less trusting in US elections. This gap in voter confidence has been understudied, in particular regarding how trust in elections might differ between Asian American, Blacks, Latinos and whites — and why these differences among racial and ethnic groups persist. We use a Bayesian multilevel model approach, applied to observational data from the 2024 CMPS. The CMPS has unique oversamples of nonwhite voters to evaluate differences in trust in elections for Asian American, Black, Latino, and white voters. The Bayesian approach allows us to generate reliable estimates of voter confidence for these different racial and ethnic groups. We find that there are gaps in trust, with white voters generally having the highest trust in elections. We then leverage the large oversamples of nonwhite voters to assess how trust varies across Asian American and Latino voter subgroups. Finally, we use other attitudinal measures to compare how common explanations for trust in elections fare across racial and ethnic groups, in particular the relative explanatory power of mode of voting, the winner-loser effect, and affective polarization. Our research has important implications for bolstering confidence in American elections, especially among historically marginalized groups of voters.

This is a working draft of this paper, last updated July 13, 2026. Please do not share without permission.

1 Introduction

Voter confidence is central to public and academic conversations about the U.S. electoral system. Over the years, research has shown that voters with less confidence are less likely to participate in elections, have reduced levels of weaker civic engagement, and are less trusting of democratic institutions (Alvarez et al. 2008; Atkeson et al. 2015). Concerns about voter confidence have grown in recent years, as research has shown that elite rhetoric affects voter confidence, as elite messaging arguing that fraud is rampant in U.S. elections has been shown to reduce voter confidence (Berlinski et al. 2023).

A critical gap in the literature is a deeper understanding of why certain segments of the U.S. electorate might have diminished confidence in elections. Our focus here is on the Asian American, Black, and Latino segments of the electorate, as confidence in election administration has not been studied in depth for these voters. Recent work on racial differences in voter confidence has found that the inclusiveness of a state’s voting laws seems to be a key factor (Coll and Clark 2024; Uribe et al. 2025). Our research in this paper seeks to build off of this recent work and to develop a much deeper and thorough understanding about what drives voter confidence for these important segments of the U.S. electorate.

Our findings offer three key takeaways for the study of voter sentiment towards election processes. The first finding is that there is a clear racial gap in voter confidence between white and nonwhite voters. White voters have a much lower probability of low voter confidence than Black or Latino voters, and are slightly less likely than Asian American voters to have low confidence. The second key finding is that by estimating the direct effect of race on voter confidence, we find that approximately 2 percentage points of the gap between white and Black/Latino voters can be attributed to race on its own. This 2 percentage point gap is what remains when all other covariates are held at their observed values in each racial group, indicating that at least some portions of the racial gap in

voter confidence are attributable to the legacy of race on voter attitudes and not just a byproduct of group-level differences in the distribution of other relevant covariates. Our third and final finding is that there are perceptible differences in voter confidence across Asian American and Latino national origin subgroups. Overall, our novel disaggregation of voter confidence by race and national origin presents newly detailed insights into who trusts election administration. We provide new evidence of how American racial hierarchies continue to shape how voters view election administration, which future research can use to further probe which racial groups of voters are confident and why.

2 The Racial and Ethnic Gap in Voter Confidence

Voter confidence in election administration has been a central concern for more than two decades (Atkeson and Saunders 2007; Alvarez et al. 2008). Early research depicted voter confidence as a multidimensional construct, as voters can be confident in whether their own ballot was counted as they intended — and also may have different levels of confidence in election administration in their county, state, or across the nation (Atkeson and Saunders 2007; Alvarez et al. 2008). Voter confidence was also conceptualized as being a function of public trust about specific institutions of election administration, and not just an expression of more generalized trust in government (Atkeson et al. 2015).

The early work on voter confidence helped to define the directions that much of the subsequent studies in this growing literature has taken. One of the primary themes has been studying individual-level identities and how they are associated with voter confidence. It should not be surprising to learn that partisan identifiers are associated with voter confidence (Atkeson and Saunders 2007; Alvarez et al. 2008). However, the association between partisanship and voter confidence has been shown to be conditional on election outcomes, in the form of the “winner’s effect” (or the “loser’s effect”) (Sances and Stewart 2015; Sinclair et al. 2018). In the aftermath of a Republican electoral victory,

for example, Republican voters are more likely to express confidence in the administration of the election.

Voter confidence is also associated with other perceptions about the electoral process. Several studies have examined voter confidence and opinions about the prevalence of election fraud (Alvarez et al. 2021; Fortin-Rittberger et al. 2017; Berlinski et al. 2023; Beaulieu 2014). Not surprisingly, voters who believe that election fraud is more prevalent are generally found to be less confident in election administration (Alvarez et al. 2021). Thus, the messaging and rhetoric of partisan elites plays an important role, in particular in situations where their rhetoric focuses on allegations of widespread or rampant election fraud (Berlinski et al. 2023; Beaulieu 2014; Clayton et al. 2021).

Importantly, voter confidence in elections is associated with the voter's experience with election administration Alvarez et al. (2021). This association has been shown in different contexts. Early work found a correlation between voter confidence and the mode of voting, with those voting by mail expressing lower levels of confidence (Alvarez et al. 2008). Other work has looked more closely at other aspects of a voter's experience with the election process, finding that if a voter generally does not have a great experience, that is associated with reduced confidence in election administration (Alvarez et al. 2021; Claassen et al. 2008).

However, one of the outstanding issues in the study of voter confidence regards how voters from different racial and ethnic groups evaluate election administration. Research has generally shown that non-white voters are less confident than white voters (Alvarez et al. 2008). Some studies have examined the association between racial and ethnic identities, relative to other factors like partisanship and voting experience (Bullock et al. 2005; Tobin et al. 2025). There is intriguing research that indicates that if a Black or Latino voter interacts with a poll worker of their racial or ethnic identity, that is associated with greater confidence in the election process (King and Barnes 2019). Others have

recently argued that differences in the overall accessibility of the election process might play some role in explaining the racial gap in voter confidence (Uribe et al. 2025). But understanding the racial and ethnic differences in voter confidence in the U.S. remains an important question.

Providing answers for the question about how U.S. voter confidence differs across racial and ethnic groups has been thwarted by a key methodological issue. Most of the past research on voter confidence uses survey samples that are underpowered for studying the opinions of nonwhites in the U.S. For example, many of the studies in the literature use nationally-representative samples, based on the responses of 1,000 or 2,000 respondents. As the racial and ethnic composition of the U.S. electorate is approximately 60% white, 15% Black, 20% Latino, and 8% Asian American, that means that these samples will contain somewhere between 300 and 600 Black, Latino, and Asian American respondents. Such a sample might allow researchers to estimate white versus nonwhite opinions with some reliability, but will not allow the reliable estimation of richer differences between these racial and ethnic groups. And these datasets cannot allow the estimation of variations in voter confidence within these racial and ethnic groups. We advance the study of voter confidence by using a dataset that has large oversamples of Black, Latino, and Asian American respondents, thus giving us statistical power to study the richness differences in voter confidence across and within these racial and ethnic populations. We also use an estimation approach, Bayesian hierarchical modeling, that allows reliable estimation of the uncertainty in our estimates which provides an additional improvement over past research.

3 Our Contribution

Our central contribution is providing robust estimates of how voter confidence differs across key racial and ethnic groups and as well as pan-ethnic subgroups of voters. Other

studies have largely focused on how broader population-level effects such as the winner-loser effect and the voter experience shape voter confidence among American voters as a whole. While past research has found that nonwhite voters tend to have lower confidence on average than white voters (Alvarez et al. 2008), no other study to our knowledge makes this racial gap the main focus of their work. Additionally, most other studies do not have large enough samples of nonwhite voters to conduct such research. Through the use of a unique national-level survey of U.S. voters with large oversamples of nonwhite voters, we are able to estimate voter confidence across these groups with significantly more precision than past studies. We also go beyond existing work by documenting how voter confidence varies *within* racial groups, in line with past scholarship calling for more attention to how voter confidence differs among Asian American and Latino panethnic subgroups.

In general, we see voter confidence as influenced by a combination of attributes related to group histories with political institutions, levels of knowledge about and incorporation into the American political system, the voter experience with past and current elections, and other group-influenced attributes such as partisanship and political ideology. It is well documented that these attributes all vary importantly by race (Masuoka and Junn 2013; McClain and Stewart 2014), and that differences in relative accessibility and political mobilization can often lead nonwhite voters to trust electoral institutions to a lesser degree (Uribe et al. 2025). We therefore expect that white voters, given their relative centrality in American politics and higher degrees of status within the broader racial hierarchy (Kim 1999; Zou and Cheryan 2017), will have higher levels of voter confidence than nonwhite voters. We also expect that for these same reasons of some groups being more marginalized than others (Ocampo et al. 2025), voter confidence will vary in important ways across panethnic Asian American and Latino subgroups. We present our relevant hypotheses below.

H1: White voters will express higher levels of voter confidence than Asian American, Black, and Latino voters.

H2: There will be meaningful differences in levels of voter confidence across national origin subgroups of Asian American and Latino voters.

4 Data and Methodology

4.1 Data

We use observational data from the 2024 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Study (CMPS) to evaluate how voter confidence varies across the four CMPS main sample racial groups: Asian American, Black, Latino, and white voters. The CMPS is particularly useful for conducting this analysis given its large oversamples of nonwhite voters. While many nationally-representative surveys like the American National Election Studies include large numbers of voters overall, the sizes of each nonwhite subsample are too small for an in-depth analysis such as ours. Even then, some racial subsamples in surveys like the ANES are especially small, particularly Asian Americans and Latinos. Using the CMPS allows us to overcome this methodological hurdle. After restricting the sample to just those who voted in the 2024 election, there are 2,065 Asian American voters, 3,140 Black voters, 2,114 Latino voters, and 1,621 white voters in the final sample. The CMPS therefore renders it more feasible to conduct granular analyses of the political attitudes of all four voter groups.

Furthermore, the large oversamples of Asian American and Latino voters allow us to study the behavior of national origin-based subgroups. It has long been observed that there are important variations in the political behavior and attitudes of voters across these subgroups of these broader pan-ethnic racial groups. However, quantitatively studying these differences is often challenging for the same reasons as studying Asian American and

Latino behavior in general. If subsamples of Asian Americans and Latinos are already small within most nationally-representative surveys, then using national-level samples to precisely measure behavioral nuances across subgroups is often impossible. The large CMPS samples of Asian American and Latino voters allow us to take our analyses a step further by creating racial subgroup-focused models that estimate how voter confidence varies across these subgroups. In doing so, we offer the first (to our knowledge) large-scale quantitative evaluation of voter confidence across the Asian American and Latino pan-ethnic umbrellas.

4.2 Explanatory and Outcome Variables

Explanatory variables: race and racial subgroup. Given our focus on voter confidence, we subset the larger CMPS sample to just those who reported voting in the 2024 election. We then use the CMPS standardized measure of race to group respondents into one of four racial categories: Asian American, Black, Latino, or white. The CMPS asks respondents to self-identify into as many racial groups as applicable at the start of the survey. This item notes that some people may identify with more than one racial group, and while most respondents choose just one group, some select more than one. If a respondent selects more than one racial group, a follow-up item asks them which group they would consider their “primary race or ethnicity” if asked to choose one. Their response to the primary race/ethnicity item response is how respondents are then sorted into one of the four primary sample categories.

A similar process is used to evaluate national origin subgroups among Asian American and Latino respondents. Respondents who identify as Asian American are asked about their “primary ethnicity or family ancestry,” if they had to choose one. Respondents who identify as Latino are asked to which “country or place” they or their family “trace [their] ancestry.” The survey again acknowledges that Latinos may trace their ancestry to

multiple countries, but encourages respondents to select what they would consider their “primary ancestry.” Asian American and Latino respondents can select only one of these national origin categories, which are then collapsed into one of eight national origin-based racial subgroups based on available sample sizes.

Outcome variable: voter confidence. We use the four-item battery for voter confidence introduced by Alvarez et al. (2008) and included in the 2024 CMPS. This battery asks respondents how confident they are that ballots are being counted as voters intended at various levels of election administration. The item on which we place the greatest amount of focus is how confident voters are that *their own* ballot was counted as they intended. However, respondents are also asked how confident they are that ballots are being counted as intended at the county, state, and national levels. The response options range on a 4-point scale ranging from ‘not at all confident’ to ‘very confident’. The full wording for all items is included in the appendix. Given that most respondents report higher levels of voter confidence, we collapse this variable into low and high voter confidence to ensure our models are properly identified. We recode the variable such that ‘not at all confident’ and ‘not too confident’ are grouped into low confidence (0) while ‘somewhat confident’ and ‘very confident’ are grouped into high confidence (1). The full wording and distribution of these items can be found in the appendix.

4.3 Methodology

To evaluate the relationship between voter confidence and race, we conduct Bayesian multilevel binary logit regression models. We use Bayesian multilevel models to estimate these quantities because of their strong performance in detecting patterns of behavior within smaller subsamples of surveys like the CMPS (Gelman et al. 2020; Gelman and Shalizi 2013; Much 2025; Gill and Bao 2026). The use of partial pooling and weakly informative priors within Bayesian multilevel modeling allows researchers to produce

more precise group-level estimations for smaller subsamples than would otherwise be possible within a frequentist framework (Gelman et al. 2013, 2020). By including a random group-level effect for race, we allow the slopes of all covariates to vary for each racial subgroup. This variation is important because it is likely that the relationship between voter confidence and other covariates such as partisanship likely vary across racial groups. While we could conduct frequentist subgroup-focused models for each racial group in isolation, we would lose a considerable amount of statistical power in doing so which would likely lead to imprecise estimates of our quantities of interest (Much 2025). Furthermore, we expect that while it is important to allow each covariate’s slope to vary by race, there are likely some commonalities in these relationships across racial groups. Information about voter confidence among whites could be useful for estimating voter confidence among Latinos, for example. In addition, in the case of a skewed variable like voter confidence, Bayesian multilevel modeling is useful for retaining enough statistical power to estimate the rarer outcome of low voter confidence.

Another advantage of using Bayesian multilevel models is the ability to better leverage the full distribution of the Asian American and Latino national origin subsamples. While the CMPS has large oversamples of nonwhite racial groups, it is still difficult to precisely estimate group-based differences at the lower end of the voter confidence distribution given that fewer respondents report low to no confidence. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that each racial group is sampled to be representative of the racial group at the national level, meaning that smaller pan-ethnic national origin groups are still small even within the context of this survey. For example, our sample of Latino voters includes 1,344 Mexicans but only 95 Dominicans. This imbalance would make it nearly impossible to produce meaningful estimates of Dominican voter confidence through standard frequentist methods. While there will still be more uncertainty in the Bayesian estimates of Dominican voter confidence than Mexican voter confidence, the partial pooling inher-

ent to Bayesian modeling allows us to make more effective use of the full sample as well as better quantify our degree of certainty for these estimates.

In the models focused on all four racial subgroups, we regress voter confidence on a variety of relevant fixed-effect covariates with a single level of random group effects for race. While we use a parsimonious number of covariates to keep the models computationally stable and manageable, we include many of the common covariates studied within this literature. For demographics, we include age, education, gender, income, and Census region. On the attitudinal front, we include party identification (3-level variable of Democrat, Republican, or independent/other), political ideology (4-level variable of moderate, other, liberal, or conservative), and political interest (additive measure scaled from 0 to 1). Finally, we also include variables related to the voting experience, as voter experience is generally understood to influence voter confidence. In particular, we include whether someone voted absentee (1 if yes, 0 if no) and whether they voted in either the 2020 or 2022 elections (1 if yes, 0 if no). Our national origin models for Asian American and Latino voters include the same covariates, but we restrict those samples to just Asian American or Latino voters respectively and include a group-level effect for national origin group rather than race.

Each model ran for 25,000 iterations with a warm-up of 24,000 iterations across 10 cores, producing a final sample of 10,000 draws. The Markov chains converged for all models with zero divergent transition for each full sample model after a run-time of approximately 13 hours. We ran each national-origin focused model for the same number of iterations, and both models converged after about 1.5 hours with no divergent transitions. Details are provided in the appendix.

Table 1: Predicted probability (in percentages) of respondent indicating each level of confidence in their own vote being counted as they intended, by race

Confidence Level	Race	Estimate	50% CI	95% CI
Low confidence				
1	White	8.46	7.99, 8.88	7.18, 9.78
1	Black	15.01	14.52, 15.35	13.84, 16.23
1	Asian Am.	9.93	9.52, 10.36	8.74, 11.20
1	Latino	13.37	12.90, 13.83	12.00, 14.77
High Confidence				
0	White	91.54	91.12, 92.01	90.22, 92.82
0	Black	84.99	84.65, 85.48	83.77, 86.16
0	Asian Am.	90.07	89.64, 90.48	88.80, 91.26
0	Latino	86.63	86.17, 87.10	85.23, 88.00


5 Results

5.1 Voter Confidence Across Racial and Ethnic Groups

We begin our analysis by examining how respondents’ confidence in how their own vote varies across racial and ethnic groups. As noted in H1, we expect white voters to be more confident about the counting of votes than nonwhite voters. Figure 1 and Table 1 show the results of our first model focused on confidence in one’s own vote. Table 1 shows the average marginal predicted probabilities of voter confidence by racial group, while Figure 1 visually displays the predicted probability of low voter confidence by racial group.

We immediately see that, in general, white voters have a lower probability than any other group of reporting low confidence that their own vote was counted as they intended. White voters have an average marginal predicted probability of approximately 8.5% of low voter confidence. That is roughly 7 percentage points lower than Black voters, 5 percentage points lower than Latino voters, and about 1.5 percentage points more than Asian American voters in this sample. Even when taking into account the full distribution of the 50% and 95% credible intervals, there is almost no overlap in the likelihood of whites

Figure 1: Average marginal predicted probability of low confidence in own vote being counted as voter intended, by racial group (50 and 95% CI)




and nonwhites having high voter confidence. Put differently, white voters have the lowest likelihood of being a low confidence voter, while Black voters have the highest likelihood of reporting low voter confidence. The lack of overlap between whites and Black/Latino voters indicates a 95% probability that voter confidence is meaningfully different between these groups of voters within this sample. While the 95% credible intervals somewhat overlap between white and Asian American voters, this overlap is relatively small and suggestive that Asian Americans in this sample have a higher probability of low voter confidence than white voters.

Importantly, these results indicate nuanced differences among Asian American, Black, and Latino voters in their voter confidence. While these groups are all less likely than whites to indicate higher levels of confidence in how their own vote was counted, there are also differences between the nonwhite groups. In general, Black voters are the least confident group in terms of point estimates. However, the predictions across the full credible interval distributions include some overlap between Black and Latino voters, suggesting that the two groups have similarly low levels of confidence in whether their vote was counted as they intended. Asian Americans, on the other hand, have consistently higher levels of voter confidence than Black and Latino voters. These results somewhat mirror theories of racial triangulation that suggest Asian Americans are positioned higher in social status or more closely proximate to whiteness than their Black or Latino counterparts (Kim 1999; Zou and Cheryan 2017). Such a pattern suggests that our observed differences by race in voter confidence could stem from racial marginalization—groups that experience more racial marginalization may also be more skeptical of electoral institutions due to these experiences and historical memories, rendering them less confident in the overall administration of elections.

Given the rather striking patterns we observe for confidence in the counting of the voter’s own vote, we now turn to whether this pattern is repeated across the other levels of

Figure 2: Average marginal predicted probability of low voter confidence across levels of election administration, by racial group (50% and 95% CI)



election administration. Figure 2 visualizes the results of this analysis, and table versions of the results can be found in the appendix.

Based on Figure 2, it is clear that our previously observed trend of whites being higher in voter confidence than nonwhites is consistent across each level of election administration. Regardless of whether the administrative level is county, state, or national vote counting, there is an over 5 percentage point gap between white and Black/Latino voters in their probability of low voter confidence. Asian American voters once again are in the middle of this gap, though Asian American voter confidence is closer to white voter confidence than it is Black and Latino voter confidence. We take these results as highly suggestive of a real and persistent gap in voter confidence across racial groups. In line with H1, white voter confidence is indeed higher than nonwhite voter confidence across all levels of election administration.

It is worth noting that voter confidence across the sample declines as we go from local election administration to national election administration. Respondents have generally higher faith across the board that their own vote was counted as intended, and that confidence declines when they consider whether votes across the county, state, or nation were counted as voters intended. We view the own vote item as a more precise measure of voter confidence, given that it more directly asks whether voters think their own vote was counted as they personally intended. As the scope of the question expands, respondents might consider news stories they have heard, the experiences of people around them, or even become more susceptible to partisan-motivated reasoning as the question relies less on their personal experience. In addition, how ballots are counted becomes a more abstract concept as the level of administration increases. The county level measure aligns with the fact that most election administration work is handled at the county level, such as the main task of processing and counting ballots. And while states might not be the ones counting ballots themselves, they do employ state-level election staff like the secretary

Table 2: Average marginal contrasts (in percentages) by race for low voter confidence

Group contrast	Estimate	50% CI	95% CI
Asian American - White	0.21	-0.27, 1.24	-1.93, 2.45
Black - White	2.41	1.52, 2.88	0.28, 4.49
Latino - White	2.01	1.36, 2.75	-0.09, 4.35

of state which more directly connects to asking voters whether they think the state is handling elections as it should. At the national level, this measure is highly abstract given the federal government’s considerably smaller role in election administration. For these reasons, we focus throughout the rest of our analyses on the own vote confidence measure and report results for the other measures in the appendix.

While in our previous analyses we looked at the average marginal predicted probabilities for each level of voter confidence by race, these predictions do not tell the full story of how race might condition voter confidence. Rather, they take the full spectrum of the posterior predictions of voter confidence for each racial group based on the observed data and average them out into the single distribution we report here. In doing so, this process incorporates the effect of other covariates in the model—such as age or past voter turnout—into the average predicted probabilities. Therefore, while we report gaps by race in predicted probabilities of voter confidence, some of these gaps might be due less to the direct effect of race on its own and due more to group-level differences along other important predictors of voter confidence, such as being over the age of 65 or having voted in past elections. It is important to consider this possibility given that, for example, our Latino voter sample skews much younger than the white sample (which is also reflective of real-world demographic trends).

We measure the direct effect of race on voter confidence by taking the average marginal contrasts of these predicted probabilities by race. For each respondent, we estimate the probability that a respondent falls into each level of voter confidence for each racial group, holding all other covariates at their actual observed values. The contrast is the difference

between these counterfactual race-based predictions. Averaging these contrasts across all respondents marginalizes over the observed distribution of covariates, which allows us to estimate the average direct effect of race on voter confidence. These differences are averaged out to calculate the *average* marginal contrast in predicted probability based on race. In this case, we are interested in whether the direct effect of race on voter confidence differs between whites and nonwhites, so we subtract the white predicted probability for each level of voter confidence from the predicted probabilities of the other nonwhite groups. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 2.

Relative to the raw differences in average marginal predicted probabilities, the racial gaps in voter confidence are much smaller here. For example, whereas there was an approximately 7 percentage point difference between white and Black voters in the average predicted probability of being very confident in how their own vote was counted, there is only an approximately 2.5 percentage point difference in both groups' predicted probabilities when using the marginal contrast approach. One way to interpret this result is to note that the 7 percentage point gap in the average marginal predictions, about 2.5 percentage points can be attributed to the racial difference of being Black rather than white. Similarly, we can attribute about 2 percentage points of the 5 percentage point difference in white and Latino voter confidence to race, but only about 0.2 percentage points of the 1.5 percentage point difference between whites and Asian Americans. Through this approach, we are better equipped to isolate the social effects of racial marginalization on voter confidence from the effects of other demographic trends like differences in median age or voter propensity. While these other demographic-related differences are indeed connected to race and important to understanding the full social context of this phenomenon, they are distinct from the race-based power and status disparities that are typically the focus when researchers discuss racial gaps in voter trust.

It is worth noting that the the 95% credible intervals for the contrasts between white

and Asian American and then white and Latino voters include zero. A skeptical reader might view this result as indicative that the racial gaps between whites and these other groups are not reliably large enough to suggest the racial gap we claim. However, most of the posterior predictions aggregate towards the positive side of zero, which we argue is more suggestive that these differences are smaller than the gap between whites and Latinos in this sample but still potentially meaningful.

We see the results of these marginal contrasts as important in two ways. For one, looking only at the differences in average marginal predictions potentially overestimates the effect of race on voter confidence. This result is suggestive that group-level differences along with other important covariates like age, past voting history, and partisanship contribute significantly to the large gap in white and nonwhite voter confidence in our earlier tests. In other words, it is likely inaccurate to say that the racial gap in voter confidence is driven entirely by racial marginalization that reduces nonwhite trust in elections. The other important point, though, is that some portion of these racial gaps are indeed based purely on race. Through the marginal contrasts we are able to more directly measure the direct effect of race on voter confidence, and the gap between Latino and white voters appears especially robust among the groups in our sample. When all else is equal in terms of demographics, there are indeed differences in voter confidence between whites and nonwhites.

5.2 Voter Confidence Across Asian American and Latino Subgroups


In the previous section, we establish that there are notable gaps in voter confidence based on race, with white voters more confident in the counting of their ballot than nonwhite voters. In this section, we extend our analysis to examine whether there are differences in voter confidence across Asian American and Latino panethnic subgroups.

It is commonly noted that there is a great deal of heterogeneity across the national origin groups that make up these panethnic ethnoracial groups, to the point that some question the utility of making broad generalizations about Asian American or Latino political behavior (Beltran 2010). In addition, Asian Americans and Latinos are generally understood to be at a lower position in the racial status hierarchy than whites (Kim 1999; Zou and Cheryan 2017), there are also within-group dynamics that shape how Asian Americans and Latinos relate to and view their other group members (e.g., see Ocampo and Ocampo (2020); Ocampo et al. (2025)). If we view voter confidence as potentially a function of characteristics like group-based histories with political institutions, relative group status, and minoritization, then it stands to reason that voter confidence could meaningfully vary between panethnic subgroups.

To test this possibility, we begin by taking the average marginal predicted probabilities of voter confidence using separate models for Asian American and Latino voters. The results of both tests are visualized in Figure 3. Tables 4 and 3 show the point estimates for each group at each level of voter confidence.

Among Asian Americans, there are some discernable differences in the average marginal predicted probabilities of voter confidence. In general, the most confident subgroup of Asian American voters are Chinese, Indian, and Japanese Americans. All three groups have an approximately 9% probability of low confidence their ballot was counted as intended. The Asian American subgroup with the highest predicted probability of low voter confidence are Vietnamese Americans at about 13%, which is close to the 11% estimate for Korean Americans. However, as is apparent in Figure 3, many of the credible intervals for these groups overlap with one another. The smaller size of some subgroups like Vietnamese Americans makes it more difficult to produce precise estimates, and the wider credible intervals reflect real variation in uncertainty across these groups. However, if we restrict our focus to the 50% credible interval where most of the posterior predic-

Figure 3: Average marginal predicted probability of respondent's confidence in their own vote being counted as they intended, across Asian American and Latino voter subgroups



tion mass is located, there are clearer differences between the higher confidence groups (Chinese, Indian, and Japanese Americans) and the lower confidence groups (Korean and Vietnamese Americans). Filipino Americans and those in the broader ‘Other’ category consistently fall somewhere in the middle.

Among Latinos we observe similar clustering across subgroups, though there are clear separations between the most confident and least confident subgroups. Cuban Americans are by far the most confident subgroup of Latino voters, with only an approximately 8% predicted probability of low voter confidence. The least confident subgroup is Puerto Ricans with an over 15% predicted probability of low voter confidence. Mexican and Dominican Americans have similar levels of voter confidence, with both groups hovering between Cubans and Puerto Ricans at all levels of voter confidence. Given that all Central and South American origin voters are pooled into a larger group, it is somewhat difficult to compare estimates for a national origin-specific group like Mexicans with estimates for all South Americans. However, in using the data we have, we gain at least a preliminary picture of how these groups might differ from one another in terms of political attitudes. South Americans as a whole are likely somewhat more confident in elections than Mexican Americans, but Central Americans are almost certainly less confident than Mexican Americans. Importantly, there is almost no overlap in the 50% credible intervals between Central and South Americans though there is more overlap in their 95% credible intervals.

When calculated via the full sample, race-level group effects model in the previous section, Latino voters as a panethnic racial group have an approximately 13% predicted probability of low voter confidence. Most Latino national origin subgroups align with this general prediction, as all subgroups aside from Cubans fall between a roughly 12 and 16% predicted probability of low voter confidence. However, by partially pooling the broader Latino voter CMPS subsample, we are able to produce more precise estimates that paint

Table 3: Predicted probability (percentage) of Asian American respondents indicating each level of confidence in their own vote being counted as they intended

Confidence Level	Subgroup	Estimate	50% CI	95% CI
Low confidence				
1	Chinese	8.65	7.83, 9.31	6.53, 10.80
1	Filipino	9.87	8.90, 10.75	7.15, 12.56
1	Indian	8.69	7.64, 9.48	5.98, 11.37
1	Japanese	8.90	7.78, 9.96	5.77, 12.16
1	Korean	10.95	9.68, 12.11	7.56, 14.68
1	Vietnamese	12.57	10.74, 13.75	8.22, 17.14
1	Other	12.01	10.75, 13.12	8.69, 15.57
High Confidence				
0	Chinese	91.35	90.69, 92.17	89.20, 93.47
0	Filipino	90.13	89.25, 91.10	87.44, 92.85
0	Indian	91.31	90.52, 92.36	88.63, 94.02
0	Japanese	91.10	90.04, 92.22	87.84, 94.23
0	Korean	89.05	87.89, 90.32	85.32, 92.44
0	Vietnamese	87.43	86.25, 89.26	82.86, 91.78
0	Other	87.99	86.88, 89.25	84.43, 91.31

a fuller picture of how voter confidence varies across the Latino panethnic umbrella. In doing so, we see that some groups, like Cuban Americans, are much higher in their overall voter confidence than we might expect based on the panethnic-level prediction alone. Similarly, the panethnic estimate for Latinos as a whole somewhat masks the fact that some groups like Central Americans and Puerto Ricans are systematically lower in their voter confidence. These estimates somewhat comport with past work demonstrating Latino within-group hierarchies that vary along lines including national origin (Ocampo et al. 2025), which further reinforces our suspicion that voter confidence is influenced by voter perceptions of relative social status and historical marginalization. Similarly, we could say that Asian Americans as a whole have a 10% predicted probability of low voter confidence. However, this group-level estimate obscures the fact that some subgroups, such as Vietnamese Americans, are likely much lower in confidence than what the panethnic group-level estimate would suggest.

Table 4: Predicted probability (in percentages) of Latino respondents indicating each level of confidence in their own vote being counted as they intended

Confidence Level	Subgroup	Estimate	50% CI	95% CI
Low confidence				
1	Mexican	13.36	12.74, 14.04	11.48, 15.33
1	Puerto Rican	15.46	14.01, 16.39	12.17, 19.01
1	South American	12.18	10.66, 13.30	8.49, 16.26
1	Cuban	7.79	6.45, 8.89	4.53, 11.57
1	Central American	15.00	13.06, 16.55	10.32, 20.54
1	Dominican	14.90	12.51, 16.80	8.95, 21.65
1	Other	13.49	11.15, 15.16	7.86, 19.74
High Confidence				
0	Mexican	86.64	85.96, 87.26	84.67, 88.52
0	Puerto Rican	84.54	83.61, 85.99	80.99, 87.83
0	South American	87.82	86.70, 89.34	83.74, 91.51
0	Cuban	92.21	91.11, 93.55	88.43, 95.47
0	Central American	85.00	83.45, 86.94	79.46, 89.68
0	Dominican	85.10	83.20, 87.49	78.35, 91.05
0	Other	86.51	84.84, 88.85	80.26, 92.14

One of the limitations of our analyses is that there are imbalances in the number of respondents within each national origin group, so we have more statistical power for estimating the voter confidence of some national origin subgroups than others. In addition, the CMPS collapses some national origin groups into broader categories when they are too small to meaningfully examine in the context of the other sample groups. For example, Peruvian Americans and Colombian Americans are grouped into the broader “South American” category, so we cannot produce estimates about either group with the data we have. In addition, there are 1,344 Mexican Americans in our Latino sample but only 95 Dominican Americans. Within our Asian American sample, there are 539 Chinese American respondents but only 163 Vietnamese American respondents, and subgroups with less coverage such as Thai or Hmong respondents are grouped into the “Other” category. However, these results are still meaningful despite the aforementioned limitations. In conducting these analyses, we present what is to our knowledge the first large-scale

comparison of voter confidence across Asian American and Latino subgroups. Through using Bayesian multilevel models, we also make the most of the sample we do have to create these comparisons. This is an important first step for deepening our understanding of voter confidence across these racially marginalized groups, and we provide a jumping off point for future research on the contours of electoral trust among Asian American and Latino voter subgroups.

6 Conclusion and Discussion

We find strong support for our expectation that voter confidence is higher among white than nonwhite voters. Through leveraging a nationally representative survey dataset with large oversamples of Asian American, Black, and Latino voters, we are able to demonstrate with novel levels of statistical precision that white voters have systematically more confidence in how votes are counted than nonwhite voters. Importantly, this pattern is consistent across all levels of election administration. Even when overall voter confidence declines at the state and national levels of administration, white voters are still more confident than their nonwhite counterparts. We also present the results of average marginal contrasts that hold non-race covariates at their observed levels, which allows us to quantify the direct effect of race on voter confidence. In doing so, we find strong evidence that when all else is equal, race does play a role in shaping voter confidence. While we cannot make causal claims with these data, we argue this direct effect is a quantified measure of the effect of racial marginalization and status hierarchies in shaping how voters feel about the political systems that govern them.

We also find some support for our expectation that voter confidence varies across Asian American and Latino panethnic subgroups, though these results are less robust given their higher levels of uncertainty. We can confidently say that some of the subgroups with more sample coverage differ from one another, such as Mexican Americans

having lower confidence than Cuban Americans and Chinese Americans having higher confidence than Korean Americans. However, that confidence is more limited when considering the smaller subgroups (such as Vietnamese and Dominican Americans), and we cannot make predictions specific to national origin groups within the Central American or South American umbrella groups. Despite these limitations, however, we present the first quantitative study of how voter confidence differs across these panethnic subgroups. In doing so, we show that ethnoracial-level estimates can obscure important within-group variations in voter confidence, presenting underestimates of voter confidence for some groups but severe overestimates for others. These results show where interested researchers might want to begin looking to understand how and why some national origin groups trust elections more than others.

Some might see these results as not all that meaningful, given that our observed direct effects based on race add up to an approximate 2 percentage point difference in the probability of high confidence in how votes are counted. Low voter confidence is also a lower incidence phenomenon, and most voters are relatively confident in how ballots are counted. However, the spread of false election rumors requires only a small but meaningful proportion of the electorate to be distrustful enough about election administration to share bad information or be dissuaded from voting. In this case, we do care about those marginal 10 to 15% of individuals who don't trust their vote is being counted as intended, because they could lead other voters to become more skeptical as well. Furthermore, the totality of our results suggest there are persistent gaps based on race in voter confidence.

Those interested in increasing voter confidence must contend with these race-based gaps, as not attending to them could perpetuate other racial inequities that are downstream from lower voter confidence among nonwhite voters. For example, voter confidence is generally associated with turning out to vote in the future. If nonwhite voters are less confident in the counting of their vote than white voters, this could additionally con-

tribute to racial turnout gaps that hamper representation for historically marginalized communities. Armed with this newly robust evidence of a racial gap in voter confidence, additional research should dissect what precisely drives this inter- and intragroup gaps.

References

- Alvarez, R. M., Cao, J. and Li, Y. (2021), ‘Voting experiences, perceptions of fraud, and voter confidence’, *Social Science Quarterly* **102**(4), 1225–1238.
URL: <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ssqu.12940>
- Alvarez, R. M., Hall, T. E. and Llewellyn, M. H. (2008), ‘Are americans confident their ballots are counted?’, *The Journal of Politics* **70**(3), 754–766.
URL: <https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1017/S0022381608080730>
- Atkeson, L. R., Alvarez, R. M. and Hall, T. E. (2015), ‘Voter confidence: How to measure it and how it differs from government support’, *Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy* **14**(3), 207–219.
- Atkeson, L. R. and Saunders, K. L. (2007), ‘The effect of election administration on voter confidence: A local matter?’, *PS: Political Science & Politics* **40**(4), 655–660.
- Beaulieu, E. (2014), ‘From voter id to party id: How political parties affect perceptions of election fraud in the us’, *Electoral Studies* **35**, 24–32.
- Beltran, C. (2010), *The Trouble with Unity: Latino Politics and the Creation of Identity*, Oxford University Press.
- Berlinski, N., Doyle, M., Guess, A. M., Levy, G., Lyons, B., Montgomery, J. M., Nyhan, B. and Reifler, J. (2023), ‘The effects of unsubstantiated claims of voter fraud on confidence in elections’, *Journal of Experimental Political Science* **10**(1), 34–49.
- Bullock, C. S., Hood, M. V. and Clark, R. (2005), ‘Punch cards, jim crow, and al gore: Explaining voter trust in the electoral system in georgia, 2000’, *State Politics & Policy Quarterly* **5**(3), 283–294.
- Claassen, R. L., Magleby, D. B., Monson, J. Q. and Patterson, K. D. (2008), ‘The effect of election administration on voter confidence: A local matter?’, *PS: Political Science & Politics* **41**(4), 655–660.
- Clayton, K., Davis, N. T., Nyhan, B., Porter, E., Ryan, T. J. and Wood, T. J. (2021), ‘Elite rhetoric can undermine democratic norms’, *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* **118**(23), e2024125118.
- Coll, J. A. and Clark, C. J. (2024), ‘A racial model of electoral reform: The relationship between restrictive voting policies and voter confidence for black and white voters’, *Public Opinion Quarterly* **88**(SI), 561–584.
- Fortin-Rittberger, J., Harfst, P. and Dingler, S. C. (2017), ‘The costs of electoral fraud: establishing the link between electoral integrity, winning an election, and satisfaction with democracy’, *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties* **27**(3), 350–368.
URL: <https://doi.org/10.1080/17457289.2017.1310111>

- Gelman, A., Carlin, J. B., Stern, H., Dunson, D. B., Vehtari, A. and Rubin, D. B. (2013), *Bayesian Data Analysis*, 3 edn, Chapman & Hall, London.
- Gelman, A., Hill, J. and Vehtari, A. (2020), *Regression and Other Stories*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K.
- Gelman, A. and Shalizi, C. R. (2013), ‘Philosophy and the practice of Bayesian statistics’, *British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology* **66**(1), 8–38.
URL: <https://bpspsychub.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.2044-8317.2011.02037.x>
- Gill, J. and Bao, L. (2026), *Bayesian Social Science Statistics: Getting Productive*, Cambridge University Press.
- Kim, C. J. (1999), ‘The Racial Triangulation of Asian Americans’, *Politics & Society* **27**(1), 105–138.
- King, B. A. and Barnes, A. (2019), ‘Descriptive representation in election administration: Poll workers and voter confidence’, *Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy* **18**(1), 16–30.
- Masuoka, N. and Junn, J. (2013), *The Politics of Belonging: Race, Public Opinion, and Immigration*, University of Chicago Press.
- McClain, P. D. and Stewart, J. J. (2014), *Can We All Get Along? Racial and Ethnic Minorities in American Politics*, 6 edn, Westview Press.
- Much, M. (2025), ‘Bayesian Multilevel Modeling for the Intersections of Race, Gender, and Class’, *Political Research Quarterly* **78**(3), 985–1006.
URL: <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/10659129251335233>
- Ocampo, A. N. and Ocampo, A. X. (2020), ‘Disaggregating the Latina/o/x “umbrella”: The political attitudes of US Colombians’, *Latino Studies* **18**(3), 390–419.
URL: <https://link.springer.com/10.1057/s41276-020-00268-2>
- Ocampo, A. X., Ocampo-Roland, A. N. and Uribe, L. (2025), ‘Latine Aspirational Status and Support for the January 6 Insurrection’, *The Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics* **10**(1), 152–179.
- Sances, M. W. and Stewart, C. I. (2015), ‘Partisanship and confidence in the vote count: Evidence from u.s. national elections since 2000’, *Electoral Studies* **40**, 176–188.
URL: <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261379415001602>
- Sinclair, B., Smith, S. S. and Tucker, P. D. (2018), ‘“it’s largely a rigged system”: Voter confidence and the winner effect in 2016’, *Political Research Quarterly* **71**(4), 854–868.
URL: <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1065912918768006>

- Tobin, C., Aronson, B., Majumder, S., Tanenbaum, H., Weber, E., Carey, J. M., Fogarty, B., Nyhan, B. and Reifler, J. (2025), ‘Losing predicts perceptions that elections were decided by fraud, but margin of loss and candidate race do not’, *Electoral Studies* **93**, 102880.
URL: <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261379424001380>
- Uribe, L., Aldridge, K., Kousser, T., Nichols-Smith, K. and Rush, T. (2025), ‘The racial gap in trust in elections (and how to close it)’, *Political Research Quarterly* **78**(4), 1408–1428.
URL: <https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129251363201>
- Zou, L. X. and Cheryan, S. (2017), ‘Two Axes of Subordination: A New Model of Racial Position’, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* **112**(5), 696–717.
URL: <https://doi.apa.org/doi/10.1037/pspa0000080>

A Appendix

Contents

A.1	Relevant survey items	2
A.1.1	Voter confidence items in 2024 CMPS	2
A.2	Sample demographics and descriptives	3
A.2.1	Sample demographics	3
A.2.2	Descriptives for voter confidence	6
A.2.3	2-category voter confidence	6
A.2.4	4-category voter confidence	8
A.3	Model notation and priors	10
A.3.1	Key model terms	10
A.3.2	Group-level random effects	10
A.3.3	Population-level random effects	10
A.3.4	Model notation	11
A.3.5	Priors	12
A.4	Average marginal predicted probabilities of voter confidence at county, state, and national levels by racial group	17
A.5	Average marginal predicted probabilities of voter confidence at county, state, and national levels by Asian American and Latino national origin	19
A.5.1	Asian Americans	19
A.5.2	Latinos	21
A.6	Marginal contrasts between white and nonwhite voter confidence at county, state, and national levels	23
A.7	Marginal contrasts between all racial groups at own, county, state, and national vote levels	24
A.8	Marginal contrasts for Asian American and Latino racial subgroups, relative to the reference category (largest subgroup in sample)	26

A.1 Relevant survey items

A.1.1 Voter confidence items in 2024 CMPS

How confident are you that your vote in the November 2024 election was counted as you intended?

- Very confident
- Somewhat confident
- Not too confident
- Not at all confident

Think about vote counting throughout YOUR COUNTY OR CITY, and not just your own personal situation. How confident are you that votes in YOUR COUNTY OR CITY were counted as voters intended?

- Very confident
- Somewhat confident
- Not too confident
- Not at all confident

Now, think about vote counting throughout [respondent's state]. How confident are you that votes in [respondent's state] were counted as voters intended in the November 2024 election?

- Very confident
- Somewhat confident
- Not too confident
- Not at all confident

inally, think about vote counting throughout the ENTIRE COUNTRY. How confident are you that votes NATIONWIDE were counted as voters intended in the November 2024 election?

- Very confident
- Somewhat confident
- Not too confident
- Not at all confident

All responses were coded to scale from 1 to 4, with a 1 indicating 'not at all confident' and a 4 indicating 'very confident.'

Table A.1: Distribution of gender by race

Race	Man	Woman	Nonbinary
White	48.24%	51.20%	0.56%
Black	46.11%	53.82%	0.06%
Asian Americans	46.92%	52.83%	0.24%
Latino	46.74%	53.12%	0.14%

Table A.2: Distribution of age by race

Race	18-29	30-44	45-64	65+
White	5.80%	24.24%	34.18%	35.78%
Black	15.80%	31.69%	32.32%	20.19%
Asian Americans	13.95%	26.44%	38.79%	20.82%
Latino	14.95%	34.72%	34.44%	15.89%

A.2 Sample demographics and descriptives

A.2.1 Sample demographics

Table A.3: Distribution of age by race

Race	HS or less	Some college	College+
White	19.86%	31.83%	48.30%
Black	28.18%	38.22%	33.60%
Asian Americans	7.75%	20.19%	72.06%
Latino	25.26%	37.18%	37.56%

Table A.4: Distribution of income by race

Race	40-50k	60-99k	Not sure	<39k	>100k
White	17.09%	26.28%	0.49%	23.75%	32.39%
Black	20.10%	24.17%	0.22%	36.69%	18.82%
Asian Americans	14.82%	26.05%	0.29%	16.08%	42.76%
Latino	20.58%	29.61%	0.24%	27.77%	21.81%

Table A.5: Distribution of party ID by race

Race	Independent	Democrat	Republican
White	11.60%	37.94%	50.46%
Black	12.64%	72.07%	15.29%
Asian Americans	16.90%	51.14%	31.96%
Latino	12.68%	52.98%	34.34%

Table A.6: Distribution of absentee voting by race

Race	0	1
White	69.71%	30.29%
Black	74.39%	25.61%
Asian Americans	53.75%	46.25%
Latino	70.34%	29.66%

Table A.7: Distribution of previous voting by race

Race	0	1
White	6.48%	93.52%
Black	10.10%	89.90%
Asian Americans	12.98%	87.02%
Latino	13.10%	86.90%

Table A.8: Distribution of Latino national origin

National Origin	Percent
Mexican	52.18%
Puerto Rican	16.79%
South American	9.65%
Cuban	7.24%
Central American	6.58%
Dominican	3.74%
Other	3.83%

Table A.9: Distribution of Asian national origin

National Origin	Percent
Chinese	26.44%
Filipino	17.29%
Indian	14.96%
Japanese	10.61%
Korean	10.65%
Vietnamese	7.22%
Other	12.83%

A.2.2 Descriptives for voter confidence

A.2.3 2-category voter confidence

Table A.10: Distribution of binary low voter confidence (own vote) by race

Race	0	1
White	1487	134
Black	2666	474
Asian Americans	1860	205
Latino	1830	284

Table A.11: Distribution of binary low voter confidence (county vote) by race

Race	0	1
White	1490	131
Black	2683	457
Asian Americans	1852	213
Latino	1834	280

Table A.12: Distribution of binary low voter confidence (state vote) by race

Race	0	1
White	1448	173
Black	2633	507
Asian Americans	1813	252
Latino	1794	320

Table A.13: Distribution of binary low voter confidence (national vote) by race

Race	0	1
White	1362	259
Black	2346	794
Asian Americans	1669	396
Latino	1641	473

A.2.4 4-category voter confidence

Table A.14: Distribution of voter confidence (own vote) by race

Race	1	2	3	4
White	37	97	438	1049
Black	132	342	916	1750
Asian Americans	52	153	643	1217
Latino	84	200	622	1208

Table A.15: Distribution of voter confidence (county vote) by race

Race	1	2	3	4
White	32	99	531	959
Black	119	338	1107	1576
Asian Americans	48	165	753	1099
Latino	65	215	767	1067

Table A.16: Distribution of voter confidence (state vote) by race

Race	1	2	3	4
White	36	137	536	912
Black	131	376	1151	1482
Asian Americans	63	189	787	1026
Latino	82	238	778	1016

Table A.17: Distribution of voter confidence (national vote) by race

Race	1	2	3	4
White	75	184	608	754
Black	250	544	1121	1225
Asian Americans	101	295	830	839
Latino	152	321	789	852

A.3 Model notation and priors

A.3.1 Key model terms

Our models focus on the attitudes of **voters**, predicting how voter confidence varies across (1) racial and ethnic groups and (2) national origin panethnic subgroups.

Voters are Asian American, Black, Latino, or white CMPS respondents who reported voting in the 2024 presidential election.

Voter confidence is the reported confidence a voter has in how accurately ballots were counted in a given election. We measure voter confidence via the standard voter confidence battery (e.g., Alvarez et al. (2008)), and we collapse responses into low (1) or high voter confidence (0). Voter confidence is captured at four different levels: confidence that the voter’s own ballot was counted as intended, confidence that ballots at the county level were counted as intended, confidence that ballots at the state level were counted as intended, and confidence that ballots at the national level were counted as intended. We estimate separate models for each level of voter confidence.

A.3.2 Group-level random effects

Race (Study 1) is the racial or ethnic group with which a partisan identifies, based on how a voter categorizes themselves. A *white* voter identifies as non-Hispanic white and no other category. A *Latino* voter is someone who identifies as Hispanic or Latino. A *Black* voter identifies as Black or African American, and an *Asian American* voter identifies as Asian American. If a CMPS respondent selects more than one racial group, they are pushed to choose the ‘primary’ racial group with which they identify, resulting in a mutually exclusive racial coding scheme.

National origin (Study 2) is the Asian American or Latino country of origin/ancestry with which the voter categorizes themselves. The Asian American subgroups represented in our sample are *Vietnamese Americans*, *Korean Americans*, *Filipino Americans*, *Japanese Americans*, *Indian Americans*, *Chinese Americans*, and then a final category called ‘*Others*’ into which all other identifiers are collapsed due to sample size. The Latino subgroups represented in our sample included *Puerto Ricans*, *Central Americans* (a category made up of different Central American countries), *Dominican Americans*, *Mexican Americans*, *South Americans* (a category made up of different South American countries), *Cuban Americans*, and again a final ‘*Others*’ category. CMPS respondents were asked to select the one country with which they identified strongest, so each category in the sample is mutually exclusive.

A.3.3 Population-level random effects

Party identification is the party with which a voter identifies. In our sample, we collapse voters into one of three categories: *Democrats and Democratic-leaners*, *Republicans and Republican-leaners*, or *independent*.

Ideology is the political ideology descriptor a voter uses to describe themselves. In our sample, we collapse all groups into *moderates*, *liberals*, *conservatives*, or *others*.

Gender is the gender category a voter identifies with. In our sample, this is collapsed into *man*, *woman*, or *nonbinary*.

Region is the U.S. Census region in which a voter lives. A voter could live in the *West*, *Midwest*, *Northeast*, or *South*.

Education is the level of education each voter has attained. In our sample, this could be *high school or less*, *some college*, or *college and above*.

Income is the level of household income each voter reports for the last year. In our sample, we collapse this into *less than \$39,000 per year*, *\$40,000 to \$59,000 per year*, *\$60,000 to \$90,000 per year*, *more than \$100,000 per year*, and *other* (for those who did not report income).

Age is the age group to which the voter belongs. In our sample, we collapse age into four groups: *18-29*, *30-44*, *45-64*, and *65+*.

Interest in politics is the level of interest the voter reports having in politics. This measure is a scale made up of 8 different items reflecting political engagement and news consumption. This variable ranges from 0 to 1, with a median of 0.44 and a mean of 0.45.

Absentee voting measures whether a voter reports voting by mail (or other types of absentee voting such as ballot drop-offs) rather than voting in person for the 2024 election. Voters received a 1 for reporting absentee voting and a 0 otherwise.

Vote history is a binary measure capturing whether a voter reported participating in the 2020 or 2022 elections. If they voted in either election, they receive a 1. If a respondent reports voting in neither election, they receive a 0.

English-speaking home (Study 2 only) refers to whether a voter reports speaking only English at home. Voters receive a 1 if they report being part of an English-only home, and a 0 otherwise.

U.S.-born (Study 2 only) refers to whether a voter was born in the United States. Respondents receive a 1 if they report having been born in the U.S., and a 0 otherwise.

U.S.-born parents (Study 2 only) refers to whether a voter's parents were born in the United States. Respondents receive a 1 if at least one parents was born in the U.S., or they receive a 0 otherwise.

A.3.4 Model notation

Study 1: modeling how voter confidence varies at the racial and ethnic group level

We begin by modeling voter confidence (at the own vote level, county-level, state-level,

and national-level) as a binary logit regression function given a vector of the aforementioned population-level covariates:

$$Confidence_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 PartyID_i + \beta_2 Ideology_i + \beta_3 Gender_i + \beta_4 Region_i + \beta_5 Education_i + \beta_6 Income_i + \beta_7 Age_i + \beta_8 InterestPolitics_i + \beta_9 AbsenteeVoting_i + \beta_{10} VoteHistory_i$$

We then model voter confidence where there are vectors of group-specific slopes for racial and ethnic group:

$$Confidence_r = \beta_0 + \beta_1 PartyID_{ir} + \beta_2 Ideology_{ir} + \beta_3 Gender_{ir} + \beta_4 Region_{ir} + \beta_5 Education_{ir} + \beta_6 Income_{ir} + \beta_7 Age_{ir} + \beta_8 InterestPolitics_{ir} + \beta_9 AbsenteeVoting_{ir} + \beta_{10} VoteHistory_{ir}, k\text{-vector of race-specific slopes}$$

Study 2: modeling how voter confidence varies by Asian American and Latino national origin

We begin by creating separate models for Asian Americans and Latinos of voter confidence (at the own vote level, county-level, state-level, and national-level) as a binary logit regression function given a vector of the aforementioned population-level covariates:

$$Confidence_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 PartyID_i + \beta_2 Ideology_i + \beta_3 Gender_i + \beta_4 Region_i + \beta_5 Education_i + \beta_6 Income_i + \beta_7 Age_i + \beta_8 InterestPolitics_i + \beta_9 AbsenteeVoting_i + \beta_{10} VoteHistory_i + \beta_{11} EnglishHome_i + \beta_{12} USBorn_i + \beta_{13} USParents_i$$

We then model voter confidence where there are vectors of group-specific slopes for national origin:

$$Confidence_r = \beta_0 + \beta_1 PartyID_{ir} + \beta_2 Ideology_{ir} + \beta_3 Gender_{ir} + \beta_4 Region_{ir} + \beta_5 Education_{ir} + \beta_6 Income_{ir} + \beta_7 Age_{ir} + \beta_8 InterestPolitics_{ir} + \beta_9 AbsenteeVoting_{ir} + \beta_{10} VoteHistory_{ir} + \beta_{11} EnglishHome_{ir} + \beta_{12} USBorn_{ir} + \beta_{13} USParents_{ir}, k\text{-vector of national origin-specific slopes}$$

A.3.5 Priors

Our priors were informed by existing studies of voter confidence and a pilot test using the 2024 SPAE dataset with variables coded to mimic our own coding scheme in this study. For variables that were not included in existing studies or the SPAE dataset (like language spoken at home), we base the prior on other similar variables for which we do have stronger priors.

Table A.18: Study 1: global-level priors

Coefficient	Distribution Type	Prior Distribution
Intercept	Student-T	(5, 0, 5)
Absentee voter	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.1)
Age: 30-44	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.15)
Age: 45-64	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.15)
Age: 65+	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.15)
Education: some college	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.2)
Education: college graduate	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.2)
Gender: nonbinary	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.1)
Gender: woman	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.1)
Ideology: conservative	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.2)
Ideology: liberal	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.2)
Ideology: other	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.2)
Income: less than \$39k	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.2)
Income: \$60-99k	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.2)
Income: more than \$100k	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.2)
Income: not reported	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.2)
Interest in politics	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.3)
PID: Democrat	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.3)
PID: Republican	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.3)
Region: Midwest	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.1)
Region: Northeast	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.1)
Region: South	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.1)
Voted 2020/2022	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.5)

Table A.19: Study 1: race-level priors

Coefficient	Distribution Type	Prior Distribution
Absentee voter	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.2)
Age: 30-44	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.15)
Age: 45-64	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.15)
Age: 65+	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.15)
Education: some college	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.2)
Education: college graduate	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.2)
Gender: nonbinary	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.1)
Gender: woman	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.1)
Ideology: conservative	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.2)
Ideology: liberal	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.2)
Ideology: other	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.2)
Income: less than \$39k	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.2)
Income: \$60-99k	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.2)
Income: more than \$100k	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.2)
Income: not reported	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.2)
Interest in politics	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.3)
PID: Democrat	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.3)
PID: Republican	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.3)
Region: Midwest	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.1)
Region: Northeast	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.1)
Region: South	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.1)
Voted 2020/2022	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.25)

Table A.20: Study 2: Global-level priors

Coefficient	Distribution Type	Prior Distribution
Intercept	Student-T	(5, 0, 5)
Absentee voter	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.1)
Age: 30-44	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.15)
Age: 45-64	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.15)
Age: 65+	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.15)
Education: some college	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.2)
Education: college graduate	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.2)
Gender: nonbinary	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.1)
Gender: woman	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.1)
Ideology: conservative	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.2)
Ideology: liberal	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.2)
Ideology: other	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.2)
Income: less than \$39k	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.2)
Income: \$60-99k	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.2)
Income: more than \$100k	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.2)
Income: not reported	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.2)
Interest in politics	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.3)
PID: Democrat	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.3)
PID: Republican	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.3)
Region: Midwest	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.1)
Region: Northeast	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.1)
Region: South	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.1)
Voted 2020/2022	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.5)
English-speaking home	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.15)
Born in U.S.	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.15)
Parents born in U.S.	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.15)

Table A.21: Study 2: subgroup-level priors

Coefficient	Distribution Type	Prior Distribution
Absentee voter	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.2)
Age: 30-44	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.15)
Age: 45-64	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.15)
Age: 65+	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.15)
Education: some college	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.2)
Education: college graduate	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.2)
Gender: nonbinary	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.1)
Gender: woman	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.1)
Ideology: conservative	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.2)
Ideology: liberal	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.2)
Ideology: other	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.2)
Income: less than \$39k	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.2)
Income: \$60-99k	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.2)
Income: more than \$100k	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.2)
Income: not reported	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.2)
Interest in politics	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.3)
PID: Democrat	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.3)
PID: Republican	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.3)
Region: Midwest	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.1)
Region: Northeast	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.1)
Region: South	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.1)
Voted 2020/2022	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.25)
English-speaking home	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.15)
Born in U.S.	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.15)
Parents born in U.S.	Student-T	(5, 0, 0.15)

A.4 Average marginal predicted probabilities of voter confidence at county, state, and national levels by racial group

Table A.22: Predicted probability (in percentage points) of confidence in county’s votes being counted as intended

Confidence Level	Race	Estimate	50% CI	95% CI
Low confidence				
1	White	8.26	7.75, 8.64	6.94, 9.53
1	Black	14.47	14.02, 14.85	13.26, 15.64
1	Asian American	10.37	9.86, 10.73	9.14, 11.70
1	Latino	13.14	12.57, 13.53	11.82, 14.57
High Confidence				
0	White	91.74	91.36, 92.25	90.47, 93.06
0	Black	85.53	85.15, 85.98	84.36, 86.74
0	Asian American	89.63	89.27, 90.14	88.30, 90.86
0	Latino	86.86	86.47, 87.43	85.43, 88.18

Table A.23: Predicted probability (in percentage points) of confidence in state’s votes being counted as intended

Confidence Level	Race	Estimate	50% CI	95% CI
Low confidence				
1	White	10.81	10.23, 11.23	9.38, 12.30
1	Black	16.01	15.50, 16.37	14.79, 17.24
1	Asian American	12.24	11.80, 12.72	10.95, 13.68
1	Latino	15.14	14.64, 15.64	13.67, 16.63
High Confidence				
0	White	89.19	88.77, 89.77	87.70, 90.62
0	Black	83.99	83.63, 84.50	82.76, 85.21
0	Asian American	87.76	87.28, 88.20	86.32, 89.05
0	Latino	84.86	84.36, 85.36	83.37, 86.33

Table A.24: Predicted probability (in percentage points) of confidence in nation’s votes being counted as intended

Confidence Level	Race	Estimate	50% CI	95% CI
Low confidence				
1	White	16.17	15.61, 16.79	14.50, 17.88
1	Black	25.19	24.64, 25.63	23.70, 26.65
1	Asian American	19.18	18.59, 19.69	17.50, 20.76
1	Latino	22.30	21.69, 22.86	20.62, 24.00
High Confidence				
0	White	83.83	83.21, 84.39	82.12, 85.50
0	Black	74.81	74.37, 75.36	73.35, 76.30
0	Asian American	80.82	80.31, 81.41	79.24, 82.50
0	Latino	77.70	77.14, 78.31	76.00, 79.38

A.5 Average marginal predicted probabilities of voter confidence at county, state, and national levels by Asian American and Latino national origin

A.5.1 Asian Americans

Table A.25: Predicted probability (in percentage points) of confidence in county's votes being counted as intended

Confidence Level	Subgroup	Estimate	50% CI	95% CI
Low confidence				
1	Chinese	8.56	7.76, 9.22	6.45, 10.79
1	Filipino	10.52	9.29, 11.22	7.77, 13.40
1	Indian	9.66	8.38, 10.34	6.89, 12.61
1	Japanese	8.24	7.12, 9.24	5.29, 11.53
1	Korean	11.73	10.27, 12.82	8.30, 15.72
1	Vietnamese	10.69	9.14, 11.97	6.84, 14.85
1	Other	14.13	12.87, 15.51	10.52, 18.13
High confidence				
0	Chinese	91.44	90.78, 92.24	89.21, 93.55
0	Filipino	89.48	88.78, 90.71	86.60, 92.23
0	Indian	90.34	89.66, 91.62	87.39, 93.11
0	Japanese	91.76	90.76, 92.88	88.47, 94.71
0	Korean	88.27	87.18, 89.73	84.28, 91.70
0	Vietnamese	89.31	88.03, 90.86	85.15, 93.16
0	Other	85.87	84.49, 87.13	81.87, 89.48

Table A.26: Predicted probability (in percentage points) of confidence in state's votes being counted as intended

Confidence Level	Subgroup	Estimate	50% CI	95% CI
Low confidence				
1	Chinese	8.28	7.50, 8.97	6.25, 10.57
1	Filipino	13.56	12.45, 14.67	10.51, 16.93
1	Indian	10.78	9.72, 11.80	7.95, 14.04
1	Japanese	12.20	10.71, 13.35	8.55, 16.27
1	Korean	16.95	15.37, 18.49	12.65, 21.56
1	Vietnamese	12.56	10.84, 13.84	8.38, 17.29
1	Other	15.45	14.15, 16.84	11.74, 19.55
High confidence				
0	Chinese	91.72	91.03, 92.50	89.43, 93.75
0	Filipino	86.44	85.33, 87.55	83.07, 89.49
0	Indian	89.22	88.20, 90.28	85.96, 92.05
0	Japanese	87.80	86.65, 89.29	83.73, 91.45
0	Korean	83.05	81.51, 84.63	78.44, 87.35
0	Vietnamese	87.44	86.16, 89.16	82.71, 91.62
0	Other	84.55	83.16, 85.85	80.45, 88.26

Table A.27: Predicted probability (in percentage points) of confidence in nation's votes being counted as intended

Confidence Level	Subgroup	Estimate	50% CI	95% CI
Low confidence				
1	Chinese	13.46	12.44, 14.23	10.91, 16.27
1	Filipino	22.65	21.31, 23.96	18.72, 26.52
1	Indian	16.41	14.96, 17.49	13.00, 20.19
1	Japanese	20.67	18.77, 21.94	16.09, 25.50
1	Korean	26.22	24.28, 27.89	21.34, 31.79
1	Vietnamese	19.18	17.23, 20.82	14.17, 24.60
1	Other	21.96	20.34, 23.37	17.68, 26.58
High confidence				
0	Chinese	86.54	85.77, 87.56	83.73, 89.09
0	Filipino	77.35	76.04, 78.69	73.48, 81.28
0	Indian	83.59	82.51, 85.04	79.81, 87.00
0	Japanese	79.33	78.06, 81.23	74.50, 83.91
0	Korean	73.78	72.11, 75.72	68.21, 78.66
0	Vietnamese	80.82	79.18, 82.77	75.40, 85.83
0	Other	78.04	76.63, 79.66	73.42, 82.32

A.5.2 Latinos

Table A.28: Predicted probability (in percentage points) of confidence in county's votes being counted as intended

Confidence Level	Subgroup	Estimate	50% CI	95% CI
Low confidence				
1	Mexican	13.74	12.94, 14.31	11.85, 15.81
1	Puerto Rican	15.21	13.86, 16.31	11.96, 18.98
1	South American	11.71	10.14, 12.77	8.03, 15.66
1	Cuban	7.20	5.85, 8.16	3.82, 10.70
1	Central American	11.59	9.93, 13.07	7.22, 16.36
1	Dominican	13.43	11.24, 15.43	7.64, 19.76
1	Other	14.13	11.48, 15.81	8.37, 20.93
High confidence				
0	Mexican	86.26	85.69, 87.06	84.19, 88.15
0	Puerto Rican	84.79	83.69, 86.14	81.02, 88.04
0	South American	88.29	87.23, 89.86	84.34, 91.97
0	Cuban	92.80	91.84, 94.15	89.30, 96.18
0	Central American	88.41	86.93, 90.07	83.64, 92.78
0	Dominican	86.57	84.57, 88.76	80.24, 92.36
0	Other	85.87	84.19, 88.52	79.07, 91.63

Table A.29: Predicted probability (in percentage points) of confidence in state's votes being counted as intended

Confidence Level	Subgroup	Estimate	50% CI	95% CI
Low confidence				
1	Mexican	16.73	16.06, 17.52	14.72, 19.04
1	Puerto Rican	14.96	13.73, 16.18	11.45, 18.55
1	South American	12.13	10.55, 13.27	8.30, 16.16
1	Cuban	10.34	8.70, 11.50	6.32, 14.46
1	Central American	13.55	11.42, 14.83	8.86, 18.89
1	Dominican	12.73	10.30, 14.28	7.29, 19.28
1	Other	14.02	11.47, 15.75	8.06, 20.66
High confidence				
0	Mexican	83.27	82.48, 83.94	80.96, 85.28
0	Puerto Rican	85.04	83.82, 86.27	81.45, 88.55
0	South American	87.87	86.73, 89.45	83.84, 91.70
0	Cuban	89.66	88.50, 91.30	85.54, 93.68
0	Central American	86.45	85.17, 88.58	81.11, 91.14
0	Dominican	87.27	85.72, 89.70	80.72, 92.71
0	Other	85.98	84.25, 88.53	79.34, 91.94

Table A.30: Predicted probability (in percentage points) of confidence in nation's votes being counted as intended

Confidence Level	Subgroup	Estimate	50% CI	95% CI
Low confidence				
1	Mexican	24.03	23.30, 24.93	14.72, 19.04
1	Puerto Rican	23.35	21.96, 24.71	11.45, 18.55
1	South American	20.35	18.31, 21.66	8.30, 16.16
1	Cuban	11.23	9.52, 12.52	6.32, 14.46
1	Central American	22.31	19.73, 23.87	8.86, 18.89
1	Dominican	18.63	15.68, 20.62	7.29, 19.28
1	Other	24.48	21.33, 26.77	8.06, 20.66
High confidence				
0	Mexican	75.97	75.07, 76.70	80.96, 85.28
0	Puerto Rican	76.65	75.29, 78.04	81.45, 88.55
0	South American	79.65	78.34, 81.69	83.84, 91.70
0	Cuban	88.77	87.48, 90.48	85.54, 93.68
0	Central American	77.69	76.13, 80.27	81.11, 91.14
0	Dominican	81.37	79.38, 84.32	80.72, 92.71
0	Other	75.52	73.23, 78.67	79.34, 91.94

A.6 Marginal contrasts between white and nonwhite voter confidence at county, state, and national levels

Table A.31: Average marginal contrasts (in percentage points) by race for low voter confidence (county level)

Contrast	Estimate	50% CI	95% CI
Asian - White	1.43	0.90, 2.39	-0.80, 3.82
Black - White	2.79	2.06, 3.44	0.68, 4.94
Latino - White	2.50	1.64, 3.19	0.35, 4.77

Table A.32: Average marginal contrasts (in percentage points) by race for low voter confidence (state level)

Contrast	Estimate	50% CI	95% CI
Asian - White	1.22	0.10, 1.80	-1.07, 3.88
Black - White	2.05	1.29, 2.70	0.20, 4.59
Latino - White	1.85	1.00, 2.49	0.01, 4.61

Table A.33: Average marginal contrasts (in percentage points) by race for low voter confidence (national level)

Contrast	Estimate	50% CI	95% CI
Asian - White	2.63	1.68, 3.59	-0.68, 5.57
Black - White	2.60	1.92, 3.58	0.03, 5.08
Latino - White	2.23	1.25, 3.08	-0.38, 4.97

A.7 Marginal contrasts between all racial groups at own, county, state, and national vote levels

Table A.34: Average marginal contrasts (in percentage points) by race for low voter confidence (own vote)

Contrast	Estimate	50% CI	95% CI
Asian - Black	-2.16	-2.93, -1.66	-4.31, -0.47
Asian - Latino	-1.85	-2.36, -1.01	-3.71, 0.24
Black - Latino	0.34	-0.17, 1.00	-1.15, 2.26
White - Asian	-0.20	-1.03, 0.43	-2.65, 1.83
White - Black	-2.38	-2.93, -1.56	-4.62, -0.37
White - Latino	-2.12	-3.06, -1.58	-3.96, 0.30

Table A.35: Average marginal contrasts (in percentage points) by race for low voter confidence (county level)

Contrast	Estimate	50% CI	95% CI
Asian - Black	-1.28	-1.90, -0.64	-3.34, 0.54
Asian - Latino	-1.07	-1.96, -0.52	-3.06, 0.96
Black - Latino	0.25	-0.28, 0.97	-1.34, 1.98
White - Asian	-1.45	-2.12, -0.57	-3.63, 0.86
White - Black	-2.78	-3.18, -1.75	-4.82, -0.76
White - Latino	-2.55	-3.14, -1.80	-4.85, -0.48

Table A.36: Average marginal contrasts (in percentage points) by race for low voter confidence (state level)

Contrast	Estimate	50% CI	95% CI
Asian - Black	-0.81	-1.91, -0.37	-3.02, 1.46
Asian - Latino	-0.61	-1.67, -0.06	-3.08, 1.57
Black - Latino	0.18	-0.63, 0.69	-1.87, 2.18
White - Asian	-1.41	-2.38, -0.64	-4.05, 0.85
White - Black	-2.24	-3.10, -1.51	-4.36, 0.18
White - Latino	-1.92	-2.58, -1.10	-4.82, 0.09

Table A.37: Average marginal contrasts (in percentage points) by race for low voter confidence (national level)

Contrast	Estimate	50% CI	95% CI
Asian - Black	0.02	-1.13, 0.63	-2.36, 2.56
Asian - Latino	0.37	-0.63, 1.26	-2.31, 2.83
Black - Latino	0.31	-0.29, 1.15	-1.90, 2.28
White - Asian	-2.70	-4.03, -2.20	-5.28, 0.39
White - Black	-2.59	-3.23, -1.58	-4.85, 0.05
White - Latino	-2.30	-3.06, -1.24	-5.00, 0.36

A.8 Marginal contrasts for Asian American and Latino racial subgroups, relative to the reference category (largest subgroup in sample)

Table A.38: Average marginal contrasts (in percentage points) by Asian American subgroup for low voter confidence (own vote level)

Contrast	Estimate	50% CI	95% CI
Filipino - Chinese	-0.05	-1.43, 0.90	-2.91, 3.46
Indian - Chinese	0.42	-1.11, 1.29	-3.44, 4.62
Japanese - Chinese	0.22	-1.08, 1.67	-3.68, 4.69
Korean - Chinese	1.80	0.23, 3.04	-2.38, 6.35
Other - Chinese	2.09	0.77, 3.35	-1.92, 7.10
Vietnamese - Chinese	3.20	0.90, 4.31	-1.66, 8.50

Table A.39: Average marginal contrasts (in percentage points) by Latino subgroup for low voter confidence (own vote level)

Contrast	Estimate	50% CI	95% CI
Central American - Mexican	1.87	-0.70, 2.94	-2.82, 8.54
Cuban - Mexican	-2.66	-4.91, -1.64	-7.85, 1.92
Dominican - Mexican	0.51	-1.55, 3.00	-5.14, 7.99
Other - Mexican	2.29	-0.67, 3.61	-3.61, 9.35
Puerto Rican - Mexican	2.90	1.55, 4.23	-0.55, 7.79
South American - Mexican	-0.16	-2.70, 0.57	-4.60, 4.74